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Protecting the Truly Persecuted:
Restructuring the Flawed
Asylum System
By KATHRYN A. DITrRICK HEEBNER*
A WOMAN FROM Nicaragua came to the United States with a valid
visitor's visa and remained longer than the visa permitted.1 She had
never been politically active in Nicaragua, though her brother had
been tortured and imprisoned because of his political activities. 2 She
never personally suffered from persecution in the past. 3
A man from Afghanistan was a member of the Mujahidin rebels, a
group attempting to prevent Soviet invasion of their country. 4 The
Soviets recruited Afghans to fight against their compatriots. 5 The man
refused to join the Soviet army.6 His brothers also refused, and they
were arrested and kidnapped by the Soviets. 7 The Afghan man bought
a fake passport to flee from the Soviets and came to the United
States.8
Another man from Afghanistan was detained by the communist
secret police after they searched his home and found an anti-commu-
nist flyer.9 He was detained for approximately one month. 10 He was
brutally beaten and deprived of food for three days." He lost con-
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1. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 424 (1987).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See In reSalim, 18 1. & N. Dec. 311, 312 (B.I.A. 1982), departed from in In re Pula, 19
I. & N. Dec. 467, 473 (holding that fraudulent circumvention of refugee procedure should
not be the sole emphasis of a discretionary ruling).
5. See id. at 313.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 312-13.
8. See id. at 312.
9. See In re N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312, 314-15 (B.I.A. 1998).
10. See id. at 315.
11. See id.
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sciousness and was hospitalized under the custody of the communist
secret police.12 When he recovered, his entire body was covered with
bruises and he had a deep wound on his right leg.13 He fled to the
United States. 14
The U.S. Government charged all three of these people with be-
ing present in the country illegally and placed them in deportation
proceedings. 15 They all applied for asylum.1 6
The Nicaraguan woman was granted asylum. 17 The two Afghan
men were not.'
Although the first Afghan man proved that it was more likely than
not that he would suffer severe persecution upon returning to his
home country, he was denied asylum as a matter of discretion because
he used a false passport to enter the United States. 19 While the U.S.
Government did not grant him asylum after his urgent attempt to flee
his persecutors, the government did grant asylum to the Nicaraguan
woman,20 and many others like her, who neither suffered past perse-
cution nor showed a likelihood of future persecution. Conversely, the
second Afghan man who suffered brutal persecution was denied asy-
lum because he could not show that he was likely to be persecuted
again upon return to his home country.21 These decisions were discre-
tionary rulings that exemplify the illogical system of asylum law.
Under current asylum law, immigration judges have broad discre-
tion to either grant or deny a refugee asylum.22 The justification for
this broad judicial discretion is the extraordinarily low burden of
proof required in asylum cases.23 Theoretically, only genuinely deserv-
ing applicants will be granted asylum despite this low burden of proof
because the immigration judges' broad discretionary powers will keep
those undeserving applicants from getting through the system. As il-
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 424; Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 312.; N-M-A-, 22 I. &
N. Dec. at 313.
16. See cases cited supra note 15.
17. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 450.
18. See Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 312; N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 313.
19. See Salim, 18 1. & N. Dec. at 312-14.
20. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 450.
21. N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 313.
22. See Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. at 443.
23. See id. at 440. An applicant for asylum must only prove that he has a subjective fear
of persecution and that this fear is "well-founded." The Court has indicated that a 10%
chance of persecution could constitute a "'well-founded fear."' Id.
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lustrated by the examples above, however, judicial discretion has been
employed in a haphazard manner and produces illogical results. Fur-
thermore, immigration judges have rarely used their discretion in any
meaningful way, essentially rubber stamping refugees' asylum applica-
tions that show a "well-founded" fear of persecution. This Comment
argues that asylum law should be restructured by Congress so as to
raise the burden of proof for applicants and lower the discretionary
leeway of the courts.
Part I of this Comment provides background regarding asylum
and restriction on removal, two remedies that prevent the U.S. Gov-
ernment from removing an alien from the country.2 4 Part II addresses
the problems with immigration judges' discretionary decisions in asy-
lum and explains why certain discretionary factors historically consid-
ered by immigration judges are unnecessary or contrary to the
purpose of asylum. Part III proposes a solution to the problems with
discretionary rulings by restructuring asylum and restriction on re-
moval. Part IV addresses the judges' new discretionary role under the
proposed system.
I. The Development and Purpose of Current Asylum
Jurisprudence
The United States has long imposed a strict immigration policy,
which regulates and limits the number and type of persons allowed to
enter and remain in the country. 25 The current law governing immi-
gration is the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), which Con-
gress first developed in 1952 to establish the standards for immigrant
admission into and removal from the United States. 26
Although the United States had developed its own immigration
policy, the law concerning refugees developed on an international
scale. Following World War I, the international community first exper-
ienced the problem of relocating thousands of war refugees. 27 This
problem increased with the flight of Jews from Hitler's religious perse-
24. The statutory term used to describe the U.S. Government's procedure of remov-
ing aliens from the country was formerly "deportation." As of the 1996 amendment to the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), this procedure is now termed "removal." See Im-
migration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-653, 100 Stat. 3655 (1986).
25. See, e.g., FongYue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (asserting Congress's
sovereign right to exclude certain classes of people from the United States).
26. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) (McCarran Act), ch. 477, 66
Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000)).
27. See KAREN MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNA-
TIONAL APPROACH 63 (2d ed. 2002).
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cution in Europe and continued to worsen after World War 11.28 The
United States did not formally address this problem until 1948, when
Congress established the Displaced Person Act of 1948, which allowed
400,000 eligible displaced persons to enter the United States. 29
The international community addressed the problem with the
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 30
("1951 U.N. Convention"). From the 1951 U.N. Convention, the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees developed the
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Sta-
tus 31 ("UNHCR Handbook"). This effort was followed by the 1967
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees32 ("U.N.
Refugee Protocol"). In 1968, the United States ratified the U.N. Refu-
gee Protocol and imposed a mandatory duty of non-refoulement,
prohibiting the Attorney General from returning an alien to a country
where his life or freedom would be threatened (now known as "re-
striction on removal").33 In 1976, Congress also enacted a statute that
authorized the Attorney General to permit "conditional entry" to a
specified number of refugees fleeing their home countries because of
persecution or a fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or
political opinion. 34
It was not until the Refugee Act of 198035 ("Refugee Act") that
aliens already physically present in the United States could legalize
their presence by applying for asylum, which eventually allows the
alien to receive legal permanent residence status in the United
States.3 6 The Refugee Act implemented asylum relief and modified
the existing form of restriction on removal3 7 in order to conform to
28. Id. at 64.
29. Id.
30. Convention Relating to Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into forceApril 22, 1954).
31. U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RE-
LATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1992) [hereinafter
UNHCR HANDBOOK).
32. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967).
33. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429 (1987); 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b) (3)
(2000).
34. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 433.
35. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 110 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1157-1159 (1980)).
36. See id.
37. With the 1986 amendments to the INA, the language regarding "withholding of
deportation" was changed to "restriction on removal." See Immigration and Nationality Act
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the international standards of refugee law.38 In creating the Refugee
Act, the House Judiciary Committee Report stated,
The Committee wishes to insure a fair and workable asylum policy
which is consistent with this country's tradition of welcoming the
oppressed of other nations and with our obligations under interna-
tional law, and feels it is both necessary and desirable that United
States domestic law include the asylum provision in the instant leg-
islation .... 39
Currently, aliens may apply for asylum within one year of their
arrival to the United States in order to have legal status in the coun-
try.40 Aliens who come to the United States and who do not have legal
status are removed from the country in a removal proceeding. 41 In a
removal proceeding, aliens who have timely applied for asylum may
also use their asylum applications as a defense to prevent the United
States government from removing them from the country.42 This
Comment will only discuss asylum as it is used as a defense in a re-
moval proceeding. In addition to asylum, restriction on removal (as
the term implies) is another form of relief from removal. It prohibits
the United States from returning an alien to a particular country, but
does not give the alien legal status in the United States.43 These two
forms of relief, asylum and restriction on removal, have different and
distinct burdens of proof, and each accords a different level of benefit
to the alien.44 In a removal proceeding, these two forms of relief are
usually pled in the alternative. The following sections describe the re-
quirements and benefits of each form of relief.
A. Asylum
Asylum involves a two-step process. When applying for asylum,
the alien first must prove that he is eligible for asylum by proving that
he is a refugee, in accordance with section 101 (a) (42) of the INA.4 5 A
refugee is defined as follows:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's national-
ity or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-653, 100 Stat. 3655 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3) (2000)). In cases and legal scholarship the terms are used interchangeably.
38. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 427-29.
39. H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 17 (1979); see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 427-29.
40. See8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000).
41. See id. § 1229a.
42. See id. § 1158.
43. See id. § 1231(a) (3).
44. See id. §§ 1158, 1231(a) (3).
45. See id. § 1158.
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country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of per-
secution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion .... 46
To be considered a refugee, the alien must prove that he has an
actual and genuinely held subjective fear of persecution. 47 The alien
must further show that this fear is objectively reasonable (i.e., "well-
founded") .48 If an applicant has suffered persecution in the past, he is
presumed to have a well-founded fear of future persecution.4 9 The
applicant must not be a member of one of the classes of aliens who
are statutorily barred from asylum, such as those who pose a threat to
national security. 50
Second, after an alien establishes that he is eligible for asylum,
the immigration judge may either grant or deny asylum in the exer-
cise of discretion. 51 If the court grants asylum to an alien, the alien
then obtains legal status in the United States and can become a legal
permanent resident in one year and, eventually, a citizen. 52 Asylum
also allows aliens to legally bring their spouses and dependents to the
United States. 53
Thus, if an alien proves only that he has a reasonable fear of per-
secution, he may be granted asylum and ultimately citizenship in the
court's exercise of discretion.
B. Restriction on Removal
In order to qualify for restriction on removal, the alien must show
that his life or freedom would be threatened in a particular country
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion. 54 In a 1984 case, INS v. Stevic,55
the United States Supreme Court held that the "would be threatened"
language of the restriction on removal statute requires the alien to
46. Id. § 1101(a) (42) (A).
47. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430-31.
48. See id.
49. See8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (1) (2003).
50. See8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2) (A).
51. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 443; 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
52. See8 U.S.C. § 1158(c).
53. See id. § 1158(b)(3)(A).
54. See id. § 1231 (b) (3) (A),
55. 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
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prove that it is more likely than not that he will be persecuted if re-
turned to his home country.56
If the alien meets the burden of proof for restriction on removal,
the immigration judge must grant the relief. Thus, the judge has no
discretionary leeway.57 Restriction on removal, however, only prevents
the court from sending an alien to the country where the alien fears
persecution. 58 The court is permitted to remove the alien to a third
country where the alien's life or freedom would not be threatened.5 9
Furthermore, the court may send the alien to his home country at any
time when conditions in that country change as to make future perse-
cution unlikely.60 As such, an alien granted restriction on removal is
in "limbo" because he cannot be returned to his home country, yet he
has no legal status in the United States.
Thus, in order to obtain the relief of restriction on removal, the
alien must prove that the chance of being persecuted upon return to
a certain country is at least fifty-one percent. Nevertheless, there is no
path to legal permanent residence or citizenship via restriction on
removal.
C. Difference in Burden of Proof Between Asylum and Restriction
on Removal
In the landmark case of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,61 the United States
Supreme Court firmly established the distinction between the burdens
of proof in these two forms of relief from removal. 62 Prior to Cardoza-
Fonseca, the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA" or "Board") noted
the difference in the two statutes' language, but applied the same
standard in practice. 63 In Cardoza-Fonseca, however, the Court held
that the statutory language of asylum and restriction on removal indi-
cates that the burden of proof in asylum cases was less stringent than
that of restriction on removal.64 Although the Court did not clearly
define the standard of proof for "well-founded fear," the Court said
that an alien did not have to prove that the likelihood of persecution
was more likely than not. The Court instead suggested that a ten per-
56. See id. at 429-30.
57. See id. at 426.
58. See8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b) (3) (A).
59. See id.
60. See8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(A) (2003).
61. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
62. See id at 446.
63. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 425 (1984).
64. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440-41; see generally 8 U.S.C. § 1159.
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cent chance of persecution would be enough to satisfy the "objectively
reasonable" element of asylum. 65 The Court further held that the
standard is met if the applicant shows that persecution is a reasonable
possibility, which is to be determined via case-by-case adjudication. 66
As the Immigration and Nationality Service ("INS") argued in
Cardoza-Fonseca, however, these burdens of proof are not consistent
with the benefit they accord.67 If an alien proves he has a well-founded
fear (that is, at least a ten percent chance of persecution) and the
court grants asylum, the alien can then become a legal permanent
resident.68 Conversely, if the alien proves that persecution is more
likely than not (that is, at least a fifty-one percent chance of persecu-
tion) and the court grants restriction on removal, the court may still
remove the alien to a country other than the one from which he based
his persecution claim, and he obtains no legal status in the United
States. 69
The Supreme Court rationalized this counter-intuitive system by
noting that more protection is accorded to asylum grantees because
the applicants not only have to establish a well-founded fear, but they
also have to warrant a favorable exercise of discretion. 70 Conversely,
for restriction on removal, there is no discretionary hurdle because
the court is obligated to grant restriction on removal if the applicant
meets his burden of proof.7' The Court's rationale only makes sense if
the discretionary hurdle actually functions as a substantial obstacle
against obtaining asylum. As of the date of Cardoza-Fonseca, however,
the discretionary factor played a deciding role in only two BIA cases.7 2
Because of the infrequence with which the discretionary hurdle had
been used before Cardoza-Fonseca, it appears as though it was cited to
by the Court in a weak attempt to justify the poorly written asylum and
restriction on removal statutes.
H. Problems with the Discretionary Tool
If the discretionary hurdle is, as the Court in Cardoza-Fonseca
claimed, the justification for the low burden of proof and the high
65. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 443.
68. See id. at 428-29 n.6.
69. See id. at 428-30.
70. See id. at 443.
71. See id.
72. See In reSalim, 18 1. & N. Dec. 311 (B.I.A. 1982); In reShirdel, 19 1. & N. Dec. 33
(B.I.A. 1984).
[Vol. 39
benefit asylum accords, then such discretion bears significant impor-
tance and should be used actively and properly. There are, however,
no standardized factors for judges to consider in making this impor-
tant discretionary decision. 73 Rather, there is only piecemeal caselaw
addressing the issue, resulting in non-use and misuse of the discre-
tionary tool.
A. Many Discretionary Factors Outlined in Pula are Unnecessary or
Contrary to the Purpose of Asylum Law
The prevailing case in discretionary asylum, In re Pula, articulated
the factors that judges should use in making discretionary asylum de-
cisions.7 4 According to Pula, a judge may deny asylum in the exercise
of discretion by considering the following negative factors: whether an
alien passed through any other countries before arriving in the
United States (including the length of time, living conditions there,
and potential for long-term residence); whether orderly refugee pro-
cedures were in fact available to him in any country he passed
through; whether he made attempts to seek asylum before coming to
the United States; whether he engaged in fraud to circumvent the
United States immigration laws; and whether the alien has family ties
to any other countries where he does not fear persecution.75
According to Pula, the courts should balance these adverse fac-
tors against countervailing equities, such as whether the alien has rela-
tives legally in the United States and whether there exists
humanitarian considerations for a favorable exercise of discretion,
such as tender age or poor health.7 6 In Pula, the Board held that when
making a discretionary ruling, these factors should be viewed in the
totality of the circumstances. 77 The court further held that "the dan-
ger of persecution should generally outweigh all but the most egre-
gious of adverse factors .... In the absence of any adverse factors...
asylum should be granted in the exercise of discretion. ' 78 The follow-
ing sections address each factor.
73. See Kalubi v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) ("There is no definitive
list of factors that the BIA must consider or may not consider.").
74. See In re Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 473-74 (B.I.A. 1987).
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 473.
78. Id. at 474.
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1. Contacts with Safe Third Countries
The first few factors listed in Pula, requiring a judge to examine
an alien's contact with third countries and the possibility of gaining
asylum in a third country, have long been a valid consideration for
asylum adjudicators. The idea behind these factors is that those aliens
afforded protection elsewhere are not in need of United States asylum
relief. For example, in In re H-,79 the Board ordered the immigration
judge to consider the applicant's stay at a refugee camp in Kenya and
whether the applicant was provided protection against refoulement
consistent with the United States commitment to non-refoulement, as
embodied in the UNHCR Handbook.80
The safe third country consideration was first defined in 1997 in
the Code of Federal Regulations, 8 1 which outlined the extent an im-
migration judge should consider an alien's contact with a third coun-
try. 82 The section provided that "[a]n asylum application may be
denied in the discretion of the Attorney General if the alien can be
removed to a third country which has offered resettlement and in
which the alien would not face harm or persecution." 83 The Ninth
Circuit later qualified this regulation in Andriasian v. INS,8 4 which
held that the time spent by a refugee in a third country before seeking
asylum in the United States only warrants a denial of asylum if the
refugee may feasibly return to that third country. 8
5
The notion of considering safe third countries now exists as a
mandatory statutory bar to eligibility for asylum. The statute reads:
(A) Safe third country
[Asylum relief] shall not apply to an alien if the Attorney General
determines that the alien may be removed, pursuant to a bilateral
or multilateral agreement, to a country (other than the country of
the alien's nationality or, in the case of an alien having no national-
ity, the country of the alien's last habitual residence) in which the
alien's life or freedom would not be threatened on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion, and where the alien would have access to a full
and fair procedure for determining a claim to asylum or equivalent
temporary protection .... 86
79. 21 1. & N. Dec. 337, 349 (B.I.A. 1996).
80. Id.
81. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(d) (1999) (repealed 2000).
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. 180 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 1999).
85. See id. at 1047.
86. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2) (A) (1) (2000).
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The law currently ensures that an alien would only be ineligible
for asylum if that alien could feasibly seek asylum in a third country
where he would not again become a victim of harm or persecution.
8 7
Therefore, because the safe third country exception has been incor-
porated into the asylum statute as a mandatory bar, it is unnecessary
for judges to re-consider it as part of their discretionary ruling.
2. Fraudulent Entry and Circumvention of Immigration Laws
The Board has held that an immigration judge may exercise dis-
cretion to deny asylum if an alien fraudulently entered the United
States or otherwise circumvented United States immigration laws. The
first discretionary asylum case, In re Salim,8 8 involved an alien who
fraudulently purchased a passport bearing someone else's name in or-
der to enter the United States without going through the refugee pro-
cess established overseas. 89 Salim was the first case the Board
adjudicated in which the applicant was statutorily eligible for asylum
by demonstrating a high likelihood of persecution, but which the im-
migration judge nonetheless denied asylum in an exercise of discre-
tion.90 The Board asserted that "public interest requires that we do
not condone this applicant's attempt to circumvent the orderly proce-
dures that our government has provided for refugees to immigrate
lawfully."9 1 Salim established a precedent that allows immigration
judges to deny asylum if aliens use false passports, misrepresent their
identity, or otherwise illegally enter the United States. 92
Although this factor was heavily relied on in Salim, the Board
later de-emphasized the extent to which immigration judges should
consider fraud and circumvention of immigration laws in asylum
cases. 93 In Pula, the Board wrote,
Yet while we find that an alien's manner of entry or attempted en-
try is a proper and relevant discretionary factor to consider in adju-
dicating asylum applications, we agree with the applicant that
Matter of Salim places too much emphasis on the circumvention of
orderly refugee procedures. This circumvention can be a serious
adverse factor, but it should not be considered in such a way that
the practical effect is to deny relief in virtually all cases .... We
87. See id.
88. 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (B.I.A. 1982).
89. See id. at 314. In the introduction to this Comment, In re Salim was the first exam-
ple of an Afghan man who applied for asylum.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 316.
92. See id.
93. See In re Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 473 (B.I.A. 1987).
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therefore withdraw from Matter of Salim insofar as it suggests that
the circumvention of orderly refugee procedures alone is sufficient
to require the most unusual showing of countervailing equities.94
Neither Congress nor the BIA, however, has ever expressly pro-
hibited judges from considering fraudulent entry and circumvention
of refugee procedures, though this consideration has been criti-
cized.95 It has been argued that the language of the asylum statute
articulating that aliens may apply for asylum "irrespective of such
alien's status" indicates that the manner in which aliens arrive in the
United States is irrelevant to their asylum claims.96
In fact, considering fraudulent entry is contrary to the entire pur-
pose of asylum. Unlike refugee processing, in which an alien applies
for refugee status overseas, asylum benefits are strictly for aliens al-
ready present in the United States, irrespective of their legal status. 97
Because refugees have a fear of persecution in their home country,
they often travel in any way possible in search of a safe haven, fre-
quently without travel documents. 98 Additionally, many aliens use
false documents to enter the United States because they are unaware
that they can apply for asylum at the border or port of entry.
Furthermore, if Congress did not want to protect aliens who have
already arrived in the United States, it would not have established asy-
lum. Rather, Congress would have promoted overseas refugee process-
ing as the sole method for relief from persecution. By establishing
asylum, it is clear that Congress accepted that refugees do frequently
enter the United States illegally and that overseas refugee processing
should not be the sole remedy for those fleeing persecution.
Some aliens may use fraudulent documents to enter the' United
States because even if they are aware of overseas refugee processing, it
may not be a viable option for them. In order to achieve refugee status
overseas, a refugee must first interview with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") or with one of the United
States Embassies. 99 If the UNHCR or the Embassy determines that the
refugee should be resettled in the United States, the applicant is re-
94. See id.
95. Deborah E. Anker, Discretionary Asylum: A Protection Remedy for Refugees under the
Refugee Act of 1980, 28 VA. J. INT'L L.1, 27 (1987).
96. See Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 472-73.
97. See8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000).
98. See Anker, supra note 95, at 27 (noting the "historical truth that refugees are often
forced because of exigent circumstances of their plight to travel across boundaries without
valid documents to obtain a safehaven in any way they can").
99. See UNHCR, COUNTRY CHAPTER USA (2004), at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/
texis/vtx/home/+CwwBmeW7PLswwwwnwwwwwwwhFqA72ZR0gRfZNtFqrpGdBnqBAFqA
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ferred to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service ("US-
CIS"). The USCIS then determines if the applicant falls within the
immigration requirements and laws of the United States.100 Only
upon a positive finding by the USCIS is a refugee allowed to enter the
United States with refugee status.10' It may not be feasible for many
aliens fleeing imminent danger of persecution to remain in the coun-
try during this lengthy process. This is particularly true for those
aliens who are in fact suffering severe persecution in their countries-
the very aliens who, in fact, will be legally deserving of asylum in the
United States.
Because the ideal goal of asylum should be to protect those flee-
ing from persecution, regardless of how they entered the United
States, immigration judges should not consider fraudulent entry when
making discretionary rulings. 1 2 To do so is, in fact, contrary to the
clear purpose of asylum law.
3. Countervailing Equities
Pula requires courts to weigh the previously discussed adverse fac-
tors103 against positive factors in the alien's case, such as strong family
ties to the United States or general humanitarian considerations.' 0 4
An alien's family ties to the United States is another factor that should
not be considered in making discretionary asylum decisions because,
again, it does not further the purpose of asylum law. Asylum is sup-
posed to be a remedy for those fleeing persecution, not those seeking
to be reunited with their families. This is not to say that family unity is
not an important goal of immigration law. Rather, because it is an
important policy concern, there are several avenues other than asylum
72ZR0gRfZNcFq5GnhltnnapGdqn55oDtDzmxwwwwwwwlFqnNObl/opendoc.pdf (last ac-
cessed Jan. 25, 2005) (describing the process of overseas refugee processing).
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. This is not to say that the judge should not consider the use of fraudulent docu-
ments subsequent to the alien's arrival in the United States. The judge should be able to
consider fraudulent documents if the alien has presented them to the court in support of
their asylum claim or used them in some way other than for emergency protection from
persecution. As will be discussed later, however, the judge should consider this when mak-
ing a credibility determination, not as a discretionary factor. See infra Part [V.A.
103. The adverse factors include the following: (1) whether the alien passed through
another country before arriving in the United States; (2) whether orderly refugee proce-
dures were available to the alien in any country he passed through; (3) whether the alien
made attempts to seek asylum before entering the United States; (4) whether the alien
engaged in fraud; and (5) whether the alien has family ties to any other country where he
does not fear persecution. See supra Part II.A.
104. See In re Pula, 19 1. & N. Dec. 467, 474 (B.I.A. 1987).
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through which an alien may immigrate to the United States if he has
family members in the country. 105 If aliens do not have family mem-
bers in the United States, they have fewer means to establish legal
residence in the United States. As they are already disadvantaged by
this, they should not be denied asylum for lack of countervailing equi-
ties to overcome the adverse discretionary factors.
Humanitarian considerations, however, are relevant, important
considerations that are in accord with the purpose of asylum law. This
Comment will later assert that humanitarian concerns should be the
sole criteria by which an immigration judge should grant or deny asy-
lum in the exercise of discretion.
B. If Immigration Judges Are to Consider Factors Beyond
Persecution, Those Factors Should Be Outlined by
Congress, Not by the Courts
As apparent from the BA's decision in Pula, ajudge's discretion-
ary role is not limited to determining the validity and extent of an
alien's fear of persecution. Indeed, the judge's discretion extends to
allow consideration of factors beyond the scope of persecution, which
effectively screen out certain undesirable or unworthy refugees from
the benefits of asylum. The Cardoza-Fonseca and Pula precedents also
support the idea that because restriction on removal effectively ac-
complishes the goal of removing persecuted aliens from harm's way,
those who seek to attain permanent resident status through asylum
should be screened more carefully than those seeking restriction on
removal.
Although under the statute the grant of asylum is left to the
court's discretion,10 6 it is well established that the ultimate power to
regulate immigration resides with the Legislature, not with the
courts)10 7 As such, if Congress intends to screen asylum applicants be-
yond their persecution claims, Congress should develop a clear statu-
tory framework that the courts can use to make their discretionary
decisions.108 Congress may accomplish this by rewriting the statute to
105. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000).
106. Id.
107. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have Power To ... establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization. .. ").
108. This does not imply that the ultimate decision should not remain discretionary. As
claims of persecution are often hard to assess on a mathematical continuum, it is inevitable
that immigration judges determine the validity of the applicants' claims on the basis of
their own discretionary evaluation. This argument simply poses that the factors judges
should consider in making this evaluation be clearly outlined by Congress.
[Vol. 39
specify the factors judges are to consider in making their discretionary
rulings. As will be proposed, Congress could also limit the judges' dis-
cretion to solely evaluating the severity of past persecution, the likeli-
hood of future persecution, and the applicability of statutory bars to
asylum.
1. The Danger of Limitless Discretionary Decisions
Currently, Congress has not defined factors for immigration
judges to consider in their discretionary rulings. The main guidance
to immigration judges has come from Pula. However, the factors dis-
cussed in Pula were not meant to be exclusive; rather, they were in-
tended to be a part of a totality of the circumstances test.109 Even if
Congress and the BIA believe judges should consider factors beyond
the scope of persecution, these factors should be limited so as to avoid
the danger of judges' considering improper factors.
A good example of an improper consideration is foreign policy
interests. In Doherty v. INS,110 the Second Circuit held that the Attor-
ney General's discretionary denial of asylum based on foreign policy
interests was an abuse of discretion. 1 On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the Attorney General's discretionary denial was affirmed on
other grounds, and the Court neglected to address whether judges
could consider foreign policy interests in asylum cases.1 12
Without an opinion from the Supreme Court, judges are not pro-
hibited from making discretionary rulings on the basis of foreign pol-
icy interests or political opinion. This may lead to dangerous results,
especially in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, when
Americans are particularly leery of allowing foreign nationals into the
United States.
In addition to considering foreign policy interests, judges have
considered factors such as the alien's demeanor while testifying and
the alien's reliance on the United States welfare system." 31 The Board
has also made discretionary decisions based on unsupported specula-
tions regarding the alien's veracity. 1 4 In Kalubi v. Ashcroft, the immi-
gration judge held, and the Board affirmed, that there was no
109. See Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 473.
110. 908 F.2d 1108 (2nd Cir. 1990).
111. See id. at 1121.
112. See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992).
113. See In re Zeng, No. A 75 318 996 (Dep't of Immigration & Naturalization May 28,
1998) (on file with author) (decision of immigration judge).
114. See Kalubi v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004).
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evidence to find the alien was not credible. 115 Nevertheless, the alien
was denied asylum as a matter of discretion because the courts did not
believe the alien's story was credible. 116 The Ninth Circuit found that
this was an abuse of discretion and reversed the decision)1 7 As there
is no definitive guidance from Congress or the Board, the courts' only
limitation is the abuse of discretion standard of review, which does not
always provide an adequate safeguard for ensuring that judges' deci-
sions are focused on the purpose of asylum rather than their own
moral screening of the asylum applicant. If Congress does intend for
other factors to be considered, it should clearly outline what those
factors are.
2. Current Coverage of Mandatory Bars to Asylum
Although Congress has not statutorily limited the factors judges
should consider when making a discretionary ruling, Congress has es-
tablished mandatory bars to asylum applications. Congress has deter-
mined that certain aliens should not be eligible for asylum, such as
those who have been convicted of serious crimes or who pose a threat
to society.' 18 In addition to excluding those who could be removed to
a safe third country (as discussed above), the other mandatory bars
exclude aliens who fit into the following categories:
(i) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in
the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion;
(ii) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a par-
ticularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of
the United States;
(iii) there are serious reasons for believing that the alien has com-
mitted a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior
to the arrival of the alien in the United States;
(iv) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a dan-
ger to the security of the United States;
(v) the alien is inadmissible under subclause (I), (II), (III), (IV), or
(VI) of section 1182(a) (3) (B) (i) of this title or removable under
section 1227(a) (4) (B) of this title (relating to terrorist activity), un-
less, in the case only of an alien inadmissible under subclause (IV)
of section 1182(a) (3) (B) (i) of this title, the Attorney General de-
115. See id. at 1135. In all asylum cases, the immigration judge must first make a thresh-
old determination of the alien's credibility. See In reO-D-, 211. & N. Dec. 1079, 1081 (B.I.A.
1998).
116. See Kalubi, 364 F.3d at 1135.
117. See id.
118. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A) (2000). There is also a list of mandatory bars to
restriction on removal, which is only slightly less extensive than the list of bars to asylum.
See id. § 1231(b)(3)(B).
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termines, in the Attorney General's discretion, that there are not
reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the se-
curity of the United States; or
(vi) the alien was firmly resettled in another country prior to arriv-
ing in United States." 9
Because these factors have been incorporated into the statute, im-
migration judges already consider them in the first part of the asylum
analysis, determining statutory eligibility. It is thus unnecessary for im-
migration judges to consider them again in their discretionar deci-
sions and entirely illogical to expect them to actually consider these
factors twice. By creating these mandatory bars, it is clear that Con-
gress considered certain classes of aliens undesirable or unworthy of
the benefits of asylum. As a matter of statutory interpretation, Con-
gress's failure to include more statutory bars implies that it may not
have intended other factors to be considered. Regardless of Con-
gress's intent, the mandatory bar does serve as an adequate way to
screen potentially dangerous or otherwise undesirable applicants with-
out giving the courts unlimited discretion to make these decisions. If
Congress intends for these bars to be the judges' only considerations
beyond persecution, Congress should clearly specify that the judges'
decisions should not include additional discretionary factors.
C. Judges Infrequently Employ Discretionary Decisions
The lack of a clear definition of the factors to be considered in
discretionary decisions may have led judges to ignore the discretion-
ary hurdle in many asylum cases. In Cardoza-Fonseca, the INS argued
that the discretionary distinction in asylum cases had no practical sig-
nificance. 120 The court addressed this argument by citing two cases
that had employed the discretionary tool to deny asylum:121 In re
Salim'22 and In re Shirdel.123 The court failed to mention, however, that
these were the only two cases to ever address the issue in the seven
years of asylum litigation prior to Cardoza-Fonseca. Additionally, these
two cases were later criticized in Pula,124 where the Board stated that
in Salim they over-emphasized the alien's use of fraudulent documents
in making their discretionary decision.1 25 Since the Cardoza-Fonseca
119. Id.
120. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 444 (1987).
121. See id.
122. 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (B.I.A. 1982).
123. 19 I. & N. Dec. 33 (B.I.A. 1984).
124. 19 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 1987).
125. See Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 473; infra Part II.A.
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case in 1987, there have been over sixty asylum cases decided by the
Board, but only eleven of these published cases actually analyzed the
discretionary element in asylum. 12 6 If the discretionary tool was actu-
ally used as a substantial hurdle, it seems there would be a much
higher percentage of asylum cases that rest on a discretionary
decision.
D. Without a Discretionary Hurdle, Asylum Is Easily Attainable and
Subject to Abuse by Aliens
Although the problems with the discretionary tool are clear,
there is theoretically a strong purpose for keeping the discretionary
hurdle in asylum cases. Without a discretionary hurdle, asylum is one
of the easiest ways for unqualified aliens to achieve legal status in the
United States under the guise of protection from persecution. An asy-
lum applicant must demonstrate an actual and genuinely held subjec-
tive fear of persecution and further show that the fear is objectively
reasonable. 127 The alien's own testimony, however, without corrobora-
tive evidence, may be sufficient to prove a well-founded fear of perse-
cution if the testimony is believable, consistent, and sufficiently
detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis for
the fear of persecution. 2 8
Abovian v. INS' 29 provides a clear example of this problem. In
Abovian, the asylum applicant, Abovian, claimed that the President of
Armenia (the head of the Armenian National Movement Party, in
competition with the Communist Party) met Abovian fifteen to twenty
times to try to recruit him to join the Armenian National Security
Committee, which Abovian claimed was run by the Russian Commu-
nist KGB.130 Abovian was not politically active and gave no evidence as
to why the President of Armenia would individually seek him out to
recruit him to join the Communist party.'31 Furthermore, Abovian
had no evidence proving that the Armenian National Security Com-
126. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, VIRTUAL
LAW LIBRARY (2004), at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/lib-indecitnet.html (last ac-
cessed Feb. 11, 2004) (publishing all BIA cases). For a complete listing of cases addressing
a discretionary ruling in asylum, see the appendix, infra.
127. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430-31.
128. See In re B-, 211. & N. Dec. 66, 71 (B.I.A. 1995). The alien is, however, required to
explain the lack of corroborating evidence if it is reasonable to expect such evidence to be
presented in court. See In re Dass, 20 1. & N. Dec. 120 (B.I.A. 1989).
129. 219 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2000).
130. See id. at 982 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
131. See id.
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mittee actually existed, that it was in any way connected to the KGB, or
that the democratically-elected President had any connection to the
Communists. 3 2
Despite the fact that Abovian's story seemed highly unlikely and
he had no corroborating evidence for anything he claimed, the Ninth
Circuit held that "independent corroborative evidence is not required
from asylum applicants where their testimony is unrefuted."' 33 Be-
cause his recitation of the events was consistent and there was no di-
rect evidence to the contrary, the court allowed his asylum application
to rest on what many think is an inconceivable story.13
4
Moreover, the objectivity of an applicant's well-founded fear does
not have to be based solely on his own personal experience. Exper-
iences of the applicant's friends, relatives, or other members of the
same racial or social group, may prove that the applicant's fear of per-
secution is well-founded. 13 5 Essentially, aliens may gain asylum with no
corroboration for their stories and no personal experience of
persecution.
In addition to the low burden of proof, asylum is appealing to
illegal aliens because they can apply for it regardless of their illegal
status in the United States. As the INA currently stands, asylum is the
single proactive means of obtaining lawful immigration status for an
alien who is already present in the United States without a visa or
green card.1 36 If an alien is illegally physically present in the United
States, the alien cannot simply apply for a visa while remaining in the
country. 137 The alien has three options: (1) remain in the United
States illegally, (2) leave the country and apply for an immigrant or
nonimmigrant visa from abroad, or (3) apply for asylum while remain-
ing in the United States. Aliens often choose to apply for asylum re-
lief, as it is the only viable option that allows them to remain in the
United States and not continue to illegally hide from immigration
authorities.
132. See id. at 983 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 978.
134. See id. at 982 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
135. See In reVillalta, 20 I. & N. Dec. 142, 147 (B.I.A. 1990) (holding that murder of his
brother and threats of harm to immediate family supported the conclusion that the appli-
cant had a well-founded fear of persecution); Ramos-Vasquez v. INS, 57 F.3d 857, 861 (9th
Cir. 1995).
136. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2000) ("Any alien who is physically present in the United
States or who arrives in the United States... irrespective of such alien's status, may apply
for asylum in accordance with this section.").
137. There are certain specialized exceptions that allow an alien present in the United
States to apply for a visa, but they will not be discussed here.
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The appealing nature of asylum, in addition to the low burden of
proof required, often leads to fabricated or exaggerated asylum
claims. It is not uncommon for immigration attorneys to prey on this
system. Immigration attorneys and consultants have been criminally
prosecuted for preparing false asylum applications and coaching ap-
plicants to rehearse false stories of persecution. 138 The discretionary
tool helps curb this abuse by serving as an extra hurdle for applicants.
The dilemma nevertheless arises because, though the discretionary
tool is much needed, it is almost impossible to use properly due to the
lack of a clear statutory outline, as discussed above. In order to solve
this problem, Congress should restructure the entire system of asylum.
HI. Restructuring Asylum Law
Because asylum and restriction on removal both protect aliens
from persecution and are usually alternative forms of relief from re-
moval, restructuring asylum necessarily includes restructuring restric-
tion on removal. To start, the burden of proof for restriction of
removal should be lowered as to give all refugees with a well-founded
fear of persecution entitlement to mandatory non-refoulement. Be-
cause an alien proves he is a refugee by establishing either past perse-
cution or a well-founded fear of future persecution,139 either means
could prevent the refugee from being removed back to a feared coun-
try. An applicant for restriction on removal should have to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is a refugee within the mean-
ing of the INA with a well-founded fear of persecution. 140 Once this is
accomplished, the immigration judge would be prohibited from re-
moving him to the country of feared persecution.
As with the current form of restriction on removal, the judge
would be able to remove the alien to a third country or back to his
home country, should conditions change to eliminate his fear of per-
secution. 4 1 Also, like the current form of restriction on removal, the
alien in this case would not achieve legal status or be able to bring
family members to the United States. Under this scheme, the least
amount of benefit (non-refoulement) would be awarded to an appli-
cant who establishes only the lowest burden of proof.
138. See In reAyala-Arevalo, 22 I. & N. Dec. 398, 399 (B.I.A. 1998); Plea Agreement at 3,
United States v. Basi (No. CR 03-0041) (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2003) (on file with author).
139. See In re H-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 337, 340 (B.I.A. 1996).
140. See In reAcosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 215 (B.I.A. 1985) (holding that an applicant
must establish the truth of the facts of their claim by a preponderance of the evidence).
141. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(A) (2003).
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Because asylum leads to legal permanent residence in the United
States, the difficulty of obtaining asylum should be higher than that
for restriction on removal. Asylum applicants should have to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that they are either more likely than
not to experience future persecution or that they experienced severe
persecution in the past that merits asylum relief. The assessment of
asylum claims should remain discretionary because it is impractical to
statutorily determine how much past persecution merits asylum or
how great the likelihood of future persecution must be to merit asy-
lum. 14 2 As such, the standard of review to the appellate courts should
remain the abuse of discretion standard. The immigration judges
should not consider any factors beyond the likelihood of future perse-
cution and the severity of past persecution. This prevents judges from
considering factors that are irrelevant or that frustrate the purpose of
asylum law. This new system would also clarify the judges' role in mak-
ing asylum determinations and ensure that the discretionary tool does
not exceed Congress's intent.
Raising the standard of proof in asylum cases would also deter
abuse of asylum by aliens.1 43 This system would deny asylum to appli-
cants who prove nothing more than that they have a well-founded fear
of future persecution. It would require those wishing to obtain legal
permanent residence status in the United States to present truly com-
pelling humanitarian reasons that merit permanent status. Even if an
alien only proves he has a well-founded fear, however, he will not be
removed back to the feared country under the restriction on removal
policy.
142. See supra text accompanying note 108. The judges' decisions should remain discre-
tionary because of the difficulty in assessing a persecution claim on a mathematical
continuum.
143. Another possible remedy for the abuse of asylum law is to liberalize other immi-
gration laws to provide alternatives to asylum. As mentioned above, asylum relief is the sole
proactive remedy available to aliens who 'are physically present in the United States and
who want to obtain legal status. By creating another means for aliens to obtain status, the
number of frivolous and fabricated asylum claims would drop. Congress can do this, for
example, by extending section 245(i) of the INA. Section 245(i) currently allows aliens
who are out of status and physically present in the United States to gain lawful permanent
resident status if they have an immediate family member in the United States or a labor
certification and an employer who will sponsor their application. See Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952 § 245(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (2000). However, the alien had to have
filed the application for lawful permanent residence before April 30, 2001, an arbitrary
date that the legislature set for applications. Id. § 1255(i) (1) (B) (i). A simple extension of
this date would give aliens an alternate means to legal status, thereby eliminating some of
the unwarranted asylum claims. Congress could make reforms along these lines to give
aliens more viable options, other than asylum, for obtaining legal status in the United
States.
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IV. The Immigration Judges' Role Under the Proposed
Structure
A main goal of restructuring asylum and restriction on removal is
to clearly outline the judges' role so that they can perform their duties
with consistency and in the manner that Congress intends. Under the
proposed rubric, judges would be required to make credibility deter-
minations, apply the mandatory bars to asylum, and then assess the
likelihood of future persecution and the severity of past persecution.
A. Credibility Determinations
An important tool judges would retain is the ability to make a
credibility finding at the initial stage of the case. As the law stands, in
all applications for asylum and restriction on removal, the judge must
make a threshold determination of the alien's credibility. 144 After the
court observes the applicant's demeanor while on the witness stand,
the court is to determine whether the applicant's story is believable,
consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coher-
ent account of the basis of his fear. 145
Although, as discussed, fraudulent entry into the United States
should not be considered in making a discretionary ruling, fraudulent
presentation of documents could be considered in assessing credibil-
ity. For example, in In re O-D-,146 the Board found that the alien's pres-
entation of a counterfeit identity card to the immigration court for
the purpose of applying for asylum discredited his testimony. 147 The
Board found that the use of the identity card pertained to the central
element of his claim, his identity, and was therefore a relevant consid-
eration for the Board in determining credibility. 148 The Board distin-
guished this circumstance from others in which the alien used a
fraudulent document to escape immediate danger.' 49 The Board
wrote, "On the other hand, there may be reasons, fully consistent with
the claim of asylum, that will cause a person to possess false docu-
ments, such as the creation and use of a false document to escape
persecution by facilitating travel."' 50
144. See In re O-D-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1079, 1081 (B.I.A. 1998).
145. See In re Dass, 20 I. & N. Dec. 120, 124 (B.I.A. 1989).
146. 21 1. & N. Dec. 1079 (B.I.A. 1998).
147. See id. at 1081-82.
148. See id. at 1082.
149. See id. at 1081.
150. See id. at 1083.
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By making this distinction, the Board recognized that the presen-
tation of fraudulent documents to facilitate travel was a common oc-
currence in asylum cases and therefore should not always defeat an
asylum claim. But, the Board also found that it is appropriate to con-
sider such actions in making credibility determinations when aliens
present fraudulent documents to the court in support for their asylum
applications.
Using this scheme, applicants who rely on fraudulent documents
simply to reach the United States would not be denied asylum, but
those whose continued use of fraud discredits them will be denied
asylum. This is also consistent with case law that has forgiven the use
of fraudulent entry, such as in the case of In re Fauziya Kasinga.151 In
Kasinga, the asylum applicant fled her native country of Togo to avoid
the cultural practice of female genital mutilation.152 The applicant
bought a fraudulent passport to leave the country, but did not present
it to authorities in the United States. 153 She immediately requested
asylum upon her arrival at the airport.154 As opposed to the alien in 0-
D-, Kasinga was found credible and her application was granted.
155
B. Determining Whether a Mandatory Bar Applies
In addition to making a credibility finding, an immigration judge
would retain the duty to determine if one or more of the mandatory
bars to asylum apply.0The judge currently has the ability to deny asy-
lum to applicants that may be removed to a safe third countries, to
applicants that were persecutors of others, those convicted of a serious
crime, or those who are a danger to security.' 56 The ability to make
these determinations allows ajudge to deny asylum to those applicants
who Congress feels do not merit the benefits of asylum.
C. Determining the Likelihood of Future Persecution
In determining the likelihood of future persecution, judges
would employ the same methods as those used under the previous
asylum regime, such as examining country condition reports from the
State Department and Human Rights Watch. Under the proposed ru-
bric, changed country conditions would not be a discretionary consid-
151. See In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 359 (B.I.A. 1996).
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 368.
156. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(2)(A) (2000).
RESTRUCTURING THE ASYLUM SYSTEMWinter 2005]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
eration, but rather would be a part of the analysis to determine if the
applicant has met his burden of proof that it is more likely than not
that he would suffer persecution upon return to his home country.
D. Determining the Severity of Past Persecution
As an alternative to proving a high likelihood of future persecu-
tion, the alien could also be granted asylum by showing severe past
persecution. By granting asylum in cases where compelling humanita-
rian considerations merit asylum relief, the United States would be in
compliance with prior caselaw, regulations, the UNHCR Handbook,
and the ideals of human rights. 157 The idea of granting asylum for
humanitarian reasons was first clearly articulated in In re Chen.158
In Chen, the applicant and his family suffered from past persecu-
tion in China because his father was a Christian minister.159 During
the Cultural Revolution of 1966, the Red Guards imprisoned Chen's
father.160 The elder Chen was repeatedly dragged through the streets
in a humiliating fashion and pushed into a bonfire of burning Bibles,
where he was severely burned. 161 During a ransacking of Chen's home
when he was eight years old, he was forced to remain in a locked room
with his grandmother for over six months. 162 The Red Guards at-
tempted to "reeducate" Chen by forcing him to criticize his father. 163
They threw rocks at Chen, giving him a severe head injury. 164 Because
of the severe beatings he suffered, Chen was physically debilitated and
was forced to wear a hearing aid due to his head injury. 165
In this case, the court held that if an applicant establishes that he
had been persecuted in the past on account of a protected ground, he
is eligible for asylum.' 66 The court found, however, that due to
changes in China, there was almost no likelihood of future persecu-
tion. Therefore, Chen's fear of future persecution was not well-
founded. 167 The court held that there may be cases where the
favorable exercise of discretion is warranted for huinanitarian reasons
157. See In reChen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16 (B.I.A. 1989); 8 CFR § 208.13(b)(1)(iii) (2003).
158. 20 I. & N. Dec. 16 (B.I.A. 1989).
159. See id. at 19.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 20.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 18.
167. See id. at 21.
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even if there is little likelihood of future persecution. 68 The court
reached this decision by referring to the UNHCR Handbook, which
states that
[i] t is frequently recognized that a person who-or whose family-
has suffered under atrocious forms of persecution should not be
expected to repatriate. Even though there may have been a change
of regime in his country, this may not always produce a complete
change in the attitude of the population, nor, in view of his past
experiences, in the mind of the refugee. 169
Chen is an example of a case that makes logical sense under this
new proposed restructure. Chen met the definition of a refugee be-
cause of the past persecution he suffered. Furthermore, because the
persecution he suffered was so severe, he was granted a favorable exer-
cise of discretion for asylum relief.
The Board has used the standard of compelling humanitarian
reasons in several cases.' 70 As the Board articulated in In re N-M-A-,
"compelling reasons" to grant asylum may include the degree of harm
suffered by the applicant, the length of time over which the harm was
inflicted, and the evidence of severe psychological trauma stemming
from the harm. 17' In making this discretionary ruling of whether past
persecution merits a grant of asylum, judges should also consider the
general humanitarian considerations such as tender age and health.
Conclusion
Due to the inadequate, infrequent, and inconsistent use of the
discretionary hurdle in asylum cases, the low burden of proof has not
justified the grant of asylum. The current system frequently has
awarded asylum to non-persecuted applicants while screening out
some who have been severely persecuted in the past. The scattered
case law addressing the discretionary issue has not provided immigra-
tion judges with a clear standard to apply. Congress, with which Con-
stitutional authority to determine how asylum should be granted
ultimately rests, and not appointed administrative judges, should be
the body that defines how asylum should be granted.
In order to ensure that asylum law fulfills its purpose of being a
remedy for those fleeing persecution, it must be restructured to re-
quire more than a simple showing of a well-founded fear. This show-
168. See id. at 19.
169. See id. (citing UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 31, 136).
170. See id.; InreH-, 21 I.&N. Dec. 337 (B.I.A. 1996); InreN-M-A-, 22 1. &N. Dec. 312
(B.I.A. 1998).
171. See N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 326.
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ing should be either severe past persecution or a high likelihood of
future persecution. Immigration judges should be limited to consider-
ing only those factors. Additionally, by lowering the standards of eligi-
bility for restriction on removal, the burdens of proof in the two forms
of relief would be consistent with the benefit they award.
APPENDIX
Asylum and restriction on removal published BIA cases since 1987 not
dealing with discretionary decisions, in chronological order:*
* In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987) (assessing
the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard)
" In re Tomas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 464 (B.I.A. 1987) (holding that an
alien is entitled to have an interpreter present at the hearing if
the alien does not speak or understand English)
" In re A-G-, 19 I. & N. Dec. 502 (B.I.A. 1987) (holding that a
requirement to serve in the military is not automatically consid-
ered persecution)
* In reVigil, 19 I. & N. Dec. 572 (B.I.A. 1987) (analyzing whether
a fear of persecution can result from being drafted during a
nation's civil war)
* In re Maldonado-Cruz, 19 I. & N. Dec. 509 (B.I.A. 1988) (ana-
lyzing when a threat of death against a guerrilla organization
deserter constitutes persecution)
* In re Balibundi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 606 (B.I.A. 1988) (holding an
asylum application should be denied if the applicant fails to
appear for the hearing)
* In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658 (B.I.A. 1988) (assessing the
fear of persecution from the government of a former police
officer)
* In re Canas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 697 (B.I.A. 1988) (assessing the fear
of persecution from forced military service and the legal au-
thority of the Refugee Handbook)
" In re Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811 (B.I.A. 1988)
(holding that asylum applicants who were persecutors of others
are barred from asylum relief)
* In re Barrera, 19 I. & N. Dec 837 (B.I.A. 1988) (assessing the
Marielitos' fear of persecution in attempting to escape from
Cuba)
* This list does not include cases regarding adjustment of status from an asylee to a
legal permanent resident, nor cases regarding relief from persecution under Article 3 of
the United Nations' Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (1984). The cases listed include only published opinions that address asy-
lum and restriction on removal on the merits of the case.
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* In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38 (B.I.A. 1989) (holding that
China's policy of "one couple, one child" does not constitute
persecution)
* In re Fefe, 20 I. & N. Dec. 116 (B.I.A. 1989) (holding that an
asylum applicant must take the stand and cannot rely solely on
a written application)
" In re Dass, 20 I. & N. Dec. 120 (B.I.A. 1989) (holding that al-
though background evidence is not required, an asylum appli-
cant must explain why there are holes in the evidence upon
request)
" In re Villalta, 20 I. & N. Dec. 142 (B.I.A. 1990) (assessing an
alien's fear of persecution for his life being threatened because
of his activities in a student political organization)
* In re B-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 427 (B.I.A. 1991) (barring an alien
from asylum who has committed a particularly serious crime)
* In re R-O-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 455 (B.I.A. 1992) (holding that a
guerrilla organization's attempt to recruit the alien does not
constitute persecution)
* In re R-R-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 547 (B.I.A. 1992) (assessing an alien's
request to reopen his case to allow the alien to apply for
asylum)
" In re T-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 571 (B.I.A. 1992) (assessing an ethnic
Tamil alien's fear of persecution because of an alleged associa-
tion with a terrorist group)
" In reD-V-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 77 (B.I.A. 1993) (finding an alien had
a well founded fear of persecution on account of her political
opinion after she was raped by soldiers)
" In re H-M- et al., 20 I. & N. Dec. 683 (B.I.A. 1993) (assessing
changed country conditions and an applicant's fear of persecu-
tion for harsh treatment by his former government after the
alien violated the country's currency laws)
" In re K-S-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 715 (B.I.A. 1993) (finding an alien
could not establish a claim of persecution based on his fear of
the Indian government)
" In reB-, 211. & N. Dec. 66 (B.I.A. 1995) (rejecting the immigra-
tion judge's adverse credibility finding)
" In re S-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 121 (B.I.A. 1995) (requiring allegedly
incredible statements made by the alien at an asylum interview
to be presented in documentation to the court)
" In re M-S-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 125 (B.I.A. 1995) (assessing an asy-
lum applicant's statements made during an asylum interview)
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" In re S-P-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 486 (B.I.A. 1996) (finding that perse-
cution can be based on an imputed protected characteristic as
well as an actual protected characteristic)
" In re X-P-T-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 634 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that
forced sterilization or abortion can support a claim of persecu-
tion)
" In re Q-T-M-T-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 639 (B.I.A. 1996) (assessing
when a conviction for an aggravated felony bars relief from
withholding of removal)
* In re S-M-J-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 1997) (assessing the
evidence required for asylum regarding country conditions and
the alien's personal experiences)
" In reT-M-B-, 211. & N. Dec. 775 (B.I.A. 1997) (holding that the
alien must prove that it is reasonable to believe that the alleged
persecution was based on one of the enumerated protected
grounds)
" In re C-A-L-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 754 (B.I.A. 1997) (finding an alien
did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution from the
guerrillas)
" In re V-T-S-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 792 (B.I.A. 1997) (holding that
kidnapping is not necessarily persecution unless the alien can
show it was motivated by a protected ground)
" In re P-L-P-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 887 (B.I.A. 1997) (finding that the
immigration court has exclusive jurisdiction over the alien
once the INS issued an order to show cause)
" In reE-P-, 211. & N. Dec. 860 (B.I.A. 1997) (assessing credibility
of the alien and changed country conditions)
" In re S-S-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 900 (B.I.A. 1997) (finding the alien
ineligible for asylum and withholding of deportation because
he was convicted of an aggravated felony)
" In re C-Y-Z-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 915 (B.I.A. 1997) (finding that
forced sterilization does not eliminate a fear of future persecu-
tion even though sterilization in the future is no longer likely)
" In re L-S-J-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 973 (B.I.A. 1997) (finding an alien
convicted of an armed robbery was barred from asylum and
withholding of deportation)
" In re O-D-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 1079 (B.I.A. 1998) (finding an asy-
lum applicant incredible after determining the documents he
presented were counterfeit)
" In reA-S-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 1106 (B.I.A. 1998) (holding that the
B.I.A. should generally defer to the immigration judge's credi-
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bility finding, as the immigration judge is in the best position to
observe the applicant on the stand)
" In reY-B-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 1136 (B.I.A. 1998) (holding that an
applicant's claim cannot survive on weak testimony without
strong corroborating evidence)
* In reA-E-M-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1157 (B.I.A. 1998) (finding that an
alien's fear of persecution is diminished by changed country
conditions and the fact that the alien's family remained in the
country unharmed)
" In reM-D-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 1180 (B.I.A. 1998) (finding the alien
did not present adequate evidence of his identity, nationality,
or claim of persecution)
" In re O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 23 (B.I.A. 1998) (upholding
the alien's claim of persecution on the basis of the alien's Jew-
ish religion)
" In re X-G-W-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 71 (B.I.A. 1998) (allowing the
immigration courts to reopen asylum cases based on coerced
population control practices), superceded by In re G-C-L-, 23 I. &
N. Dec. 359 (B.I.A. 2002).
* In re G-A-C-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 83 (B.I.A. 1998) (finding an asylum
applicant was properly placed in deportation proceedings after
his application was denied)
" In re R-S-J-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 863 (B.I.A. 1999) (holding that false
statements under oath to an asylum officer can constitute false
testimony)
* In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999) (holding that a
victim of domestic violence must prove the violence was
promulgated by the victim's membership in a particular social
group or the victim's political opinion)
" In reA-N- & R-M-N-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 953 (B.I.A. 1999) (allowing
aliens to reopen their case to plead asylum and withholding of
deportation based on changed country conditions without ex-
plaining why they failed to appear in the original case)
" In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (B.I.A. 2000) (allowing alien to
establish fear of persecution from her father on the basis of
their differing religious beliefs)
" In re U-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 355 (B.I.A. 2002) (holding the USA
PATRIOT Act does not change the method used to determine
if an asylum applicant is suspected of terrorist activity or
whether the alien is a danger to society)
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" In re G-C-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 359 (B.I.A. 2002) (retracting BIA's
former policy of reopening asylum cases based on coercive
population control)
" In re Y-T-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 601 (B.I.A. 2003) (finding that
forced sterilization constituting past persecution was not rebut-
ted by a fundamental change in circumstances)
" In re R-S-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 629 (B.I.A. 2003) (affirming the
immigration judge's denial of asylum and restriction on re-
moval because the alien did not establish a well-founded fear of
persecution based on the applicants fear that he would be asso-
ciated with terrorists after the events of September I 1th)
Asylum and restriction on removal published BIA cases addressing dis-
cretionary decisions:
" In rePula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 1987) (articulating factors
immigration judges should use in making discretionary
decisions)
" In re Gonzales, 19 I. & N. Dec. 682 (B.I.A. 1988) (holding that a
mandatory bar to restriction on removal, being convicted of a
particularly serious crime, does not also bar asylum, but can be
considered in the judge's discretionary determination to grant
or deny asylum)
" In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16 (B.I.A. 1989) (holding that asy-
lum can be granted in the exercise of discretion based on hu-
manitarian reasons although there is little likelihood of future
persecution)
* In re Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. 99 (B.I.A. 1989) (holding that
an alien's firm resettlement in another country can be a nega-
tive factor in the immigration judge's discretionary decision;
superceded when the discretionary "firm resettlement" was codi-
fied into mandatory bar to asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2) (A)
(vi) (2000)
" In re Izatula, 20 I. & N. Dec. 149 (B.I.A. 1990) (assessing the
fear of persecution of an alien taking part in a military coup to
overthrow the former government and analyzing discretion
under the Pula factors)
* In re D-L- & A-M-, 20 I. & N. 409 (B.I.A. 1991) (applying the
Pula factors to determine that aliens from Cuba did not merit a
favorable exercise of discretion)
" In re R-, 20 1. & N. Dec. 621 (B.I.A. 1992) (holding that past
persecution did not justify a grant of asylum in the exercise of
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discretion because the applicant did not show a likelihood of
future persecution or that the past persecution was motivated
because of his political opinion)
" In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1994) (al-
lowing an applicant's homosexual status to constitute persecu-
tion on account of the alien's particular social group, granting
withholding of deportation, but denying asylum because of the
alien's criminal record)
" In re H-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 337 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that a
favorable exercise of discretion is warranted where humanita-
rian reasons indicate an applicant should not be returned to
the country where he suffered past persecution)
" In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996) (hold-
ing that the process of female genital mutilation can support a
claim of persecution, analyzing discretion under the Pula
factors)
" In re N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312 (B.I.A. 1998) (holding that if
country conditions change and the original persecutor is no
longer in existence, the burden is again on the applicant to
show a well-founded fear of persecution)
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